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Abstract 
This article takes as its point of departure Stefano Guzzini’s recent call for ‘ontological theorizing’ as 
a reflexive engagement with central concepts. In an attempt to advance this agenda, the article 
presents an accessible overview of different approaches to concept analysis to stake out the field for a 
discussion of what ontological theorising might entail. It advances the notion of concepts as ‘basic’ 
and lays out the parameters through which they obtain meaning, followed by a discussion of three 
approaches, which tackle the multifaceted nature of basic concepts within and across different 
contexts. These approaches are labelled ‘historical’, ‘scientific’ and ‘political(critical)’ and presented 
through the work of Reinhart Koselleck, Giovanni Sartori and Michel Foucault, respectively. The 
article notes that concept analysis, as discussed here, stands in tension with modern forms of theory 
building yet is a creative source for theorising that accepts the unstable, political and context-bound 
nature of ontology. 
 
 
Introduction 
In a recent contribution to a discussion about the state of International Relations (IR) theory, Stefano 
Guzzini calls for what he termed ‘ontological theorizing’, namely a reflexive engagement with central 
concepts.1 Guzzini argues that such an engagement is necessary, indeed inevitable, for basically two 
reasons. First, concepts give the field of IR its ontology. They provide analysts with an understanding 
of what is ‘out there’ and in doing so help to grasp relevant phenomena by naming and giving 
meaning to its features. Thus, Guzzini writes ‘one could also call it “constitutive” [theorizing] since it 
is mainly about theorizing the central phenomena that constitute the field of inquiry’.2 Second, 
concepts are needed to construct theories: they not only provide the ontological building blocks of a 
theory, often in the form of basic assumptions, but also the components out of which theorists 
generate their arguments. As such, concepts are ‘co-constitutive of theories; they are the words in 
which…our theorizing is done’.3 In other words, concepts give us the language both for formulating 
the phenomena we seek to explain/understand and the frameworks we build to explain/understand 
                                                
1 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of 
Theorizing’, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 521–41. 
2 Ibid., 534. 
3 Ibid., 535. 
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them. Given this, calling on theorists to pay attention to key concepts and reflect on their use makes 
sense, especially in the wake of the so-called Third Debate, which, among other things, encouraged 
scholars to question core assumptions on which theoretical arguments rest. 
 
However, answering such a call is not an easy task and requires addressing two related but 
different sets of questions. First, what exactly does paying attention to concepts entail? How can, or 
should we reflexively engage key concepts? Second, what consequences does this have for the way 
we think about and ‘do’ theory? In other words, how does a reflexive engagement with key concepts 
affect the practice of theorising? While these questions might be seen as two sides of the same coin, it 
is useful to treat them as two steps in the intellectual endeavour of ontological theorising because it 
allows becoming familiar with specialised debates underpinning each question and, hence, helps to 
appreciate the complexity of the task. Guzzini’s article offers pointers mainly in response to the first 
set of questions (although its ambition is clearly to address the second). He suggests that ontological 
theorising is, basically, a form of concept analysis. Borrowing a metaphor from Anna Leander, he 
notes that it involves writing an ‘unfinished dictionary [about the ontology] of the international’ based 
on ‘a much wider understanding of “conceptual analysis” than usually offered’. Yet his article does 
not go beyond noting that this understanding involves recognising the relevance of history and 
philosophy for ‘thinking the empirics’ by tracing a concept’s ‘historical anchorage’ and intellectual 
history.4 While Guzzini’s formidable work on power offers specific examples in this regard,5 it is 
useful to take a step back and ask what a ‘wider understanding’ of concept analysis might entail from 
a broader perspective. This is the aim of the present article. Picking up Guzzini’s thread, it addresses 
the first set of the above questions by presenting an overview of different approaches to concept 
analysis as the first leg of ontological theorising. That said, the second set of questions cannot be 
ignored, and so this article will also offer some thoughts on the link between concept analysis and 
theorising. 
 
Of course, the study of concepts has long occupied a prominent place among historians and 
philosophers, a number of whom are cited in this article. The first generation of IR scholars was 
attentive to the complex nature of key concepts, although this sensibility was later lost in the quest for 
parsimony and the reduction of concepts to variables.6 Over the last two decades, attention to concepts 
has returned to the field of IR as a result of two related developments. First, in the wake of the 
linguistic turn, parts of the field developed a more critical attitude towards the categories and 
terminologies we use and the mentalities behind them. Disillusioned with mainstream paradigms as 
                                                
4 Guzzini, ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory’, 534–37. 
5 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, International Organization 47, 
no. 3 (1993): 443–78; Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013); Stefano 
Guzzini, ‘Power’, in Concepts in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter (London: Sage Publications, 2016). 
6 For an exception see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002 [1977]). 
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analytical devices to comprehend the world, an increasing number of scholars now organise their 
research around prominent concepts such as security, power, democracy, sovereignty, or hierarchy 
and trace their historical evolution, multiple interpretations, manifestations and political 
performances. Second, there is a sense that we are living through a period of social and geopolitical 
transformation, entering a world with late-modern features accompanied by challenges to structures of 
Western dominance which have shaped the IR discipline since its inception, changing our language 
along the way.7 While these changes are experienced differently, they generate dissatisfaction with 
established concepts, more precisely a feeling that their meaning is outdated and inadequate, 
prompting modifications and inventions as witnessed in the emergence of relatively new terms (such 
as globalisation, regionalisation, climate change) or the recovery of long-neglected concepts (such as 
empire, capitalism, race). 
 
This article complements specialised engagements with particular concepts by offering a 
general and systematic discussion of heuristic frameworks, or approaches, which tackle the 
multifaceted nature of basic concepts within and across historical, theoretical and political contexts. It 
provides an accessible overview of three prominent approaches called here ‘historical’, ‘scientific’ 
and ‘political(critical)’, which are discussed through the work of Reinhart Koselleck, Giovanni Sartori 
and Michel Foucault, respectively. To my knowledge, no such comparison exists in the IR literature 
and together they provide a comprehensive picture of what concept analysis might entail. It also is 
worth noting that, whereas Guzzini directs attention to Sartori, the following discussion relies heavily 
on Koselleck. Rarely discussed in IR,8 Koselleck is a leading figure of concept history and best-
known for co-editing what is perhaps the most comprehensive ‘unfinished’ dictionary of concepts in 
existence, the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. 9  The article thus not only uses Koselleck as 
representative for the historical approach but also draws on his work, especially his notion of a ‘basic 
concept’, in preparing the ground for thinking about concept analysis more generally. With this in 
mind, the discussion proceeds in three steps: the following section introduces the notion of basic 
concepts, clusters and the issue of context, the main section outlines the three approaches, and the 
conclusion returns to the question of ontological theorising. 
 
                                                
7 One aspect of this is the critique of Eurocentrism and the corresponding emergence of/turn to/search for ‘non-
Western’ voices, see Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, eds., Thinking International Relations Differently 
(London: Routledge, 2012); John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
8 For an exception, see H. Jordheim and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Empire, Imperialism and Conceptual History’, 
Journal of International Relations and Development 14, no. 2 (2011): 153–85. 
9 The full title (translated) is Basic Concepts in History: A Historical Dictionary of Political and Social 
Language in Germany. See Reinhart Koselleck, Werner Conze, Otto Brunner, eds., Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004 
[1972]). For an interesting contemporary attempt to build a ‘critical lexicon’ of political concepts, see 
http://www.politicalconcepts.org/. 
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Approaching Concepts 
The article’s underlying premise is that the very question of what a concept ‘is’ does not have a single 
answer. Concepts never just ‘are’, they are human creations and the form they take is not only 
internally complex but also varies significantly. And any effort to ‘grasp’ this form is already an effort 
in conceptualisation. Loosely following Adi Ophir,10 the very attempt of defining a concept involves 
discussing its appearance, at least if one approaches this task with a sufficient degree of reflexivity, 
and thus leads into concept analysis. So while this section will advance a particular kind of concept – 
the basic concept – and discuss the contextual configuration it is embedded in, it does so mindful of 
the fact that the ‘definitional effort’ and the task of concept analysis are not two discrete steps but 
intertwined moves. And, somewhat counter-intuitively, this ‘definitional effort’ cannot but reveal the 
concept’s plural, contingent and open form. 
 
Concepts as Basic 
As a general point of departure let us say that a concept is an abstract frame that helps generating 
knowledge about the world by organising, naming and giving meaning to its features. In Max Weber’s 
words, concepts are our way of overcoming ‘the extensively and intensively infinite multiplicity’ of 
empirical reality.11 They help us to grasp the world epistemologically and give us an ontology we can 
relate to. Indeed, as William Connolly notes, naming something offers more than a description, it also 
gives it a character.12 Concepts enable us to communicate and research the world, also catering to the 
modern belief that once we can name something we not only know but also can control it. That said, 
as an abstract heuristic device, a concept is not considered an accurate representation of reality/the 
world – regardless of the fundamental question of whether such representation is possible – but a 
mental image which meaningfully organises this reality/world, perceived through sensory 
experiences, in the mind. Concepts thus are often seen as taking the form of what Weber called an 
‘ideal type’. The ‘ideal’ stands here for the abstract and general nature of the concept’s content that 
takes form by highlighting certain elements of a worldly phenomenon (or class of phenomena) in a 
stylised fashion, which do not exist in such stark and pure forms in empirical reality.13 While some 
concepts like ‘chair’ or ‘table’ can be seen as manifested in one concrete material object, this is not 
the case for most concepts prominent in IR, such as ‘the state’, ‘anarchy’, ‘war’ or ‘globalisation’, 
                                                
10 Adi Ophir, ‘Concept’, Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon 1, no. 1 (2011). Available at: 
http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/concept/. 
 
11 Cited in Thomas Burger, Max Weber’s Theory of Concept Formation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987), 77. 
12 William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd Edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
23. 
13 As Koselleck reminds, there also is a difference between concept and metaphor, although metaphors can 
become concepts. See Reinhart Koselleck, ‘A Response to Comments on Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’, in The 
Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts, eds. Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (Washington D.C.: 
German Historical Institute, 1996), 60.  
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which designate broad and complex phenomena whose material manifestations are plural, shifting and 
incomplete – if they are accepted to exist in the first place. 
 
This leads us to two accounts of how and where concepts are formed and can be said to exist. 
The first treats it as a cognitive property of the mind. It assumes that the concept has a pure abstract 
form that can be learned and becomes imprinted in our cognitive system, perhaps even leaves a 
physiological trace in the brain. Once this has been achieved, the concept is ‘perceived from the 
mind’s eye’.14 The second account accepts that concepts have a cognitive function but sees them as 
part of a linguistic structure. That is, in contrast to the first account, where language is merely the 
medium through which the mental representation is acquired, it holds that concepts are created 
through and exist primarily in language. Rather than individual cognitive achievements, concepts are 
seen as social, inter-subjective constructs that gain meaning in what Wittgenstein called language 
games.15 
 
The second account has risen to prominence through the ‘linguistic turn’ in the humanities 
and the social sciences and has been deeply influential in concept analyses. In asking what language 
game(s) concept analysis is dealing with, we then may differentiate between two levels: (i) academic 
research, where concepts are used as analytical categories, as tools for abstract logical reasoning and 
heuristic devices guiding empirical study, with no (necessary) direct correspondence in socio-political 
discourse; (ii) everyday life, where concepts guide thought and action of individuals and collectives 
across all sectors of society, sometimes captured as ‘indigenous categories’,16 or ‘categories of 
practice’.17 This intersects with an important question regarding the focus of concept analysis: does it 
explore how concepts (as categories of analysis) are used as building blocks of academic theories, or 
is it analysing how concepts (as categories of practice) operate in society more widely? This question 
implies a separation between two scholarly endeavours: on the one hand, academics with a specialised 
theoretical language that use concepts as analytical instruments with little or no connection with the 
frames used in broader society; indeed, not even making an assumption about whether and how 
concepts matter in everyday life. On the other hand, an academic approach with a theory about 
concepts as socio-political forces, yet which is less concerned with abstract explanations and more 
with carving out how concepts operate in everyday life. This distinction makes sense both for 
theorists who prefer to work things out in logic and those who follow a more empiricist approach. 
And yet, when analysing concepts used for studying socio-political phenomena the distinction 
becomes problematic due to the simple fact that scholars of world politics are part of the world they 
                                                
14 Ophir, ‘Concept’, 1.  
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen /Philosophical Investigations, 4th Edn, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscobe, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2010 [1953]). 
16 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 7. 
17 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond Identity’, Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1. 
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are studying and their analytical categories are intertwined with what Connolly calls the ‘terms of 
political discourse’.18 
 
The overlap between academic and socio-political conceptual language and, hence, 
ontologies, is visible across the theoretical spectrum. As Guzzini reminds, classical realists adopted 
basic concepts such as the ‘balance of power’ from practical knowledge, that is, from a ‘sense of 
history and the experience of politics’.19 In their view practical knowledge served as both source and 
recipient for scholarly knowledge and, hence, was considered the only valid point of reference for 
IR’s theoretical vocabulary. While classical realists struggled with formulating a conception of theory 
that allowed maintaining that practical connection, even realists like Waltz who claimed to be more 
‘scientific’ rely on the same concepts and, thus, can only pretend to operate on a separate level. 
Liberal theorising grapples with the overlap in its signature thesis on ‘democratic peace’, where the 
academic discussion of this thesis clearly intersects with its ‘political biography’. 20  And 
disagreements about the validity of the ‘empirical fact’ that two democracies have never fought a war 
against each other partly rest on whether categorising political systems as ‘democracy’ and their 
interaction as ‘peace’ follows abstract indicators chosen by the analyst or the perceptions of political 
actors at the time.21 At the other end of the spectrum, constructivists often theorise through the 
analysis of political discourse. A classic example is scholarship on securitisation, which problematises 
the treatment of security as an objective analytical category to explore how the concept is 
(successfully) employed by political actors and with what consequences. Yet their analyses still rely 
on a conceptualisation of security speech having a particular logic inscribed in its ‘grammar’ and 
scholars are debating the theoretical-political nature of their approach.22 Critical theorists, feminist 
and postcolonial scholars have perhaps most clearly exposed the connection between concepts as 
categories of analysis and as categories of practice, warning that scholarship often becomes part of a 
political discourse. The problem has been highlighted, for instance, in research surrounding the 
concept of ‘identity’, and while some have urged using other concepts in its place this proves difficult 
even for those who try.23 
                                                
18 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse. 
19 Guzzini, ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory’, 528. 
20 Piki Ish-Shalom, Democratic Peace: A Political Biography (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013). 
21 Ido Oren, ‘From Democracy to Demon: Changing American Perceptions of Germany during World War I’, 
International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 147–84; Stephen Chan, ‘In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and 
Promise’, Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997): 59–91. 
22 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998); Ole Waever, ‘Politics, Security, Theory’, Security Dialogue 42, nos. 4–5 (2011): 465–80. 
23 See  Brubaker and  Cooper, ‘Beyond Identity’, 1–47; Charlotte Epstein, ‘Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject 
and the Study of Identity in International Politics’, European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 
(2010): 327-350; Richard Ned Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). See also Hopf’s (not quite successful) attempt to refrain from ‘pre-theorizing’ when analysing 
identity discourses, Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2002). 
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These examples suffice to illustrate that IR scholars are well aware of the fact that their key 
concepts operate in both academic and socio-political discourse. In the terminology used in this 
article, they work with what Koselleck calls ‘basic concepts’ [Grundbegriffe]. For Koselleck, a 
concept is basic if it plays a central role in our socio-political language, and so if we consider it a 
concept ‘we cannot do without’. In his words, ‘basic concepts combine manifold experiences and 
expectations in such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent 
issues of a given time’.24 This quote points to two interrelated core features of basic concepts. First, 
they grasp, or refer to, fundamental features of a socio-political system. More specifically, they are 
leading terms [Leitbegriffe] of our vocabulary trying to categorise and grasp (links between) 
fundamental structures, processes and events; they are keywords [Schlüsselwörter] and slogans 
[Schlagwörter] used by major social, economic and political organisations and movements, and 
scholarly attempts to describe them; and they are core terms found in major theories and ideologies.25 
As such, basic concepts do not merely exist as specialised terms within  academic circles but permeate 
public/popular discourse. They are, as Foucault would put it, ‘fundamental codes of a culture’.26 Their 
ability to guide thought and action in this way is due to, second, their temporal structure containing a 
stock of experiences and an aspirational outlook. That is, Koselleck argues, the ability of a basic 
concept to grasp key features of social relations is tied to the ‘experiential content’ (Erfahrungehalt) it 
has accumulated and to the ‘innovative expectations’ it raises. This feature of concepts as both 
backward and forward-looking conveys not only that concepts have a temporal dimension but also 
that they may allude to movement and contain a promise of progress, thus pointing to their normative 
content.27 
 
While not all concepts have this quality, I contend that most, if not all prominent concepts 
used by IR theorists fall into the category of basic concepts.28 Some research projects capitalise on 
this, yet for many theorists the link between academic and socio-political discourse is uncomfortable 
as it is not clear how to deal with the connection and its possibly circular dynamic. The easy way out, 
of course, is to either ignore the link or conflate the two discourses by equating theory with ideology. 
Yet leaving those two (quite popular) moves aside, thinking about the connection is challenging also 
because it reveals the complexity and openness of a concept. After all, to say that a concept is basic 
does not imply consensus on its meaning, if anything the opposite is the case. Basic concepts tend to 
                                                
24 Koselleck, ‘A Response to Comments’, 64. 
25 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces to Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’, trans.  Michaela Richter, 
Contributions to the History of Concepts 6, no. 1 (2011): 8. 
26 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1970 [1966]). 
27 See also Connolly’s critique of the distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ concepts and his point 
that key concepts help us to grasp the world in both ways. See Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 22–
35.  
28 For a selection, see Berenskoetter, Concepts in World Politics. 
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be contested precisely because they are basic and open to interpretation, which prompts different 
actors to try to claim a monopoly on its meaning.29 And with contestation occurring on the theoretical 
as well as the socio-political level, the challenging scope of the task becomes apparent. 
 
Grounded in a commitment to reflexivity, ontological theorising cannot get around addressing 
a concept’s ‘basicness’. More precisely, concept analysis – the first leg of ontological theorising – as a 
systematic study of the formation and performance of core concepts involves exploring the overlap 
between academic and socio-political discourse, as well as strategies for dealing with it. Before 
outlining different avenues along which this may take place, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
configuration through which a concept’s meaning is created by reading it as a cluster and embedded 
in context(s). 
 
Concepts as Clusters and in Context(s) 
Concepts tend to be attached to words, although not exclusively and not necessarily always to the 
same word. As such, a concept is more than a word. Whereas the meaning of a word points to one 
particular thing, a concept catches and bundles multiple elements, aspects and experiences and relates 
them to each other. Similar to Jacques Lacan’s ‘button tie’ [point de capiton] through which an 
otherwise empty signifier (temporarily) fixes and knots together meanings, a concept is an idea that 
connects a number of ‘things’ in an ‘ideal type’ configuration. Connolly thus speaks of ‘cluster 
concepts’.30 
 
To make sense of this configuration, or cluster, it is common to draw on structural linguistics 
and view a concept situated in a ‘semantic field’ formed out of links to other concepts, creating a 
particular web of concepts [Begriffsnetz].31  In this web, three kinds of links are prevalent: to 
supporting concepts which are integral to the meaning of our concept (sovereignty for the state); to 
cognate concepts with similar meanings, or whose meanings correspond with each other and bear 
what Wittgenstein called a family resemblance (football and basketball are both games, to use his 
famous example); and to contrasting concepts that are opposite in meaning, sometimes even taking 
the form of counter-concepts (as in reactionary-revolutionary), which relate to and (in)form each other 
through a dialectic. These links forming a conceptual web do not need to be grounded in logic but can 
be habitual, sentimental or normative, and thus seemingly arbitrary in character. And they become 
particularly interesting when presented as (supporting) a causal relationship, as in the case of the 
aforementioned democratic peace thesis. Here ‘democracy’ is linked to ‘republics’ to ground the 
thesis in the philosophical authority of Kant, it contains the concept of ‘freedom’ and is tied to ‘peace’ 
                                                
29 Koselleck, ‘Response to Comments’, 65. 
30 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 14. 
31 Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’. 
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arguably because both freedom and peace are considered desirable/good, and the thesis relies 
significantly on the concept of ‘non-democracy’ and, especially, ‘war’ to stabilise its meaning.32 Yet 
not only are these supporting concepts embedded in semantic fields of their own, the echoes of which 
in turn influence how we read the basic concept, or the particular causal argument at hand. As 
Connolly argues, it also is problematic to place cluster concepts in causal relationship as this converts 
a conceptual connection into a purely analytical one.33 
 
At the same time, a basic concept is not an umbrella term. Its meaning is not arrived at by 
simply ‘adding up’ the constituting elements, not least because it is the concept which enables us to 
organise and make the connections between those ‘elements’. In the words of Koselleck, a concept ‘is 
not simply indicative of the relations which it covers; it is also a factor within them’.34 In his 
programmatic introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Koselleck uses the example of the 
state to illustrate this crucial point: 
 
‘Think of all the elements that enter into the word ‘state’ so as to turn it into a 
concept: domination, territorial sovereignty, citizenship, legislation, adjudication, 
administration, taxation, and military force, to just name the common ones [and one 
could add government, police, and borders]. All of them, with their own complex 
subject matter and terminology, are incorporated into the word state, which then 
becomes elevated to the status of a concept. Concepts are thus concentrations of 
many semantic contents’.35 
 
This internal richness leads to the issue of definition. On the one hand, it seems difficult to define 
something that contains many elements and meanings. And, indeed, if we understand the purpose of a 
definition to be fixing meaning, concepts cannot be defined; as Nietzsche famously put it ‘only that 
which has no history can be defined’.36 On the other hand, it is through the definition that we move 
beyond the word to express the concept’s constitutive elements and indicate how they relate, that is, 
how the cluster is formed. Such a definition does not fix meaning. Staying with the above example, 
consider Weber’s well-known definition of the state as ‘that community which holds the monopoly 
over the legitimate use of physical force within a particular area [Gebiet]’.37 While this is a seemingly 
                                                
32 Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3–4 
(1983): 205–35, 323–53; Stephen Chan, ‘In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise’, Mershon 
International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997): 59–91. 
33 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 17–20. 
34 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004 [1979]), 86. 
35 Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, 20. 
36 Ibid., 20. 
37 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation. 
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specific definition that appears to capture important elements, it still is vague and requires of us to 
clarify the meaning of terms such as ‘community’ or ‘legitimacy’. And, of course, Weber’s definition 
is still partial and misses elements that others might consider integral to the state. The point here is 
that the selective nature of a definition constrains meaning, yet even a seemingly clear definition will 
be ambiguous, or sufficiently vague, and allows for multiple readings. Thus, as Koselleck notes, 
concepts cannot be given definite meaning, they can only be interpreted.38 
 
To understand why and how certain elements and relations are chosen and why a concept is 
interpreted in a particular way, we need to pay attention to ‘context’ – the frame, environment or field 
within which a concept is embedded. More precisely, we need to pay attention to the relationship 
between concept and context. That is, accounting for concepts in context not only involves asking 
about how the former is placed in the latter and how this imbues the concept with meaning; it also 
involves having an eye on how the concept is situated in a particular context and shapes (our 
understanding of) the latter. Thus, we might say concept analysis involves tracing how a basic concept 
is formed and how it performs within a context. But how to conceive of ‘context’ and a concept’s 
location within it? Even the specialised literature tends to give only a vague answer and often prefers 
to not define ‘context’ at all.39 For the present purpose, it is clear that we need to move beyond 
semantic fields. To capture the formation and performance of a basic concept, we need to account for 
the ways it is used and understood across different sectors of society, carve out its expression in extra-
linguistic forms, and understand its historical depth, which often provides the concept with 
interpretative authority, but also is a major source of its complexity. Given this, it seems sensible to 
speak not about context (in the singular) but about different contextual layers, or dimensions. For 
analytical purposes, at least, ‘context’ can be broken down into four such dimensions: political, 
temporal, material, and theoretical. 
 
The socio-political dimension asks for attention to the formation and performance of a 
concept in (international) society and within a political system: to trace how a concept is used and its 
meaning manifested by political actors, its diffusion throughout society/the system and the different 
understandings and usages seen in different parts of that society/system. It also directs attention to 
how a concept shapes society and how its meaning becomes a subject of political contestation. The 
temporal dimension involves studying the historicity of a concept and how its meaning content is 
formed and evolves over time. It views concepts as embedded within a particular historical moment 
                                                
38 Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, 20. 
39 Even anthropologists, for whom sensitivity to context is of central importance, concede that ‘it does not seem 
possible…to give a single, precise, technical definition of context (…) the term means quite different things 
within alternative research paradigms, and indeed even within particular traditions seems to be defined more by 
situated practice’, C. Goodwin and A. Duranti, eds., Rethinking Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1992), 2. See also Lawson’s discussion of historical context, George Lawson, ‘The Eternal Divide? 
History and International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (2012): 213–16.  
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and/or particular structures stretching over time into the future. Conversely, analysts may ask how a 
concept shapes our understanding of time, namely how it directs our temporal orientation and 
privileges certain readings of past and future. The material dimension asks us to look at the material 
space(s) and bodies in which the concept is used and manifests itself, including what happens to 
meaning when the concept travels from one material context to another. Equally, it asks us to be 
sensitive about how concepts organise and shape (our awareness of) material spaces and bodies. 
Finally, the theoretical dimension directs attention to how concepts are situated in a broader ideational 
framework, or narrative. It requires exploring the role a concept plays in a particular theoretical 
ontology and argumentative logic and how it acquires meaning through this role. Koselleck hints at 
‘theories included in [basic] concepts’.40 Keeping in mind the reciprocal relationship between concept 
and context, we also need to ask what a concept does for/to a theory, including how and why theorists 
build their theories around, or through, particular concepts. More precisely, if as noted earlier basic 
concepts are webs, or clusters, then we must understand how a theoretical narrative weaves concepts 
together into a particular web and is itself constituted through this web. 
 
While questions of theorising naturally direct attention to the last of these dimensions, all four 
hang together. What is more, it makes sense to conceive of contexts as dynamic rather than static and, 
given their interrelated nature, the same goes for concepts. Consequently, exploring a concept’s 
clustered nature within context poses a formidable analytical challenge. It is not the ambition of this 
article to provide such an analysis, but to present three approaches that emphasise different 
dimensions and trace the formation and performance of basic concepts in different ways. 
 
Three Approaches to Concept Analysis 
This section outlines three approaches to concept analysis through the work of Koselleck, Sartori and 
Foucault, respectively.41 Their differences rest to an important degree on their respective motivations 
for engaging basic concepts in the first place, that is, by what they see as the purpose of concept 
analysis. The first approach, represented by Koselleck, is motivated by the goal to treat a concept 
historically by tracing its evolution over time and, thereby, excavate diverse readings. The second 
approach, represented by Sartori, aims at specifying and grounding the concept empirically in travels 
across space, motivated by the attempt to maintain the idea of a universal theory anchored in 
empirical data. And the third approach, represented by Foucault, seeks to critically expose the 
political formation and performance of a concept and the discourse it is part of. The decision to start 
with the historical approach is for the same reason it is highlighted by Guzzini: while perhaps the least 
theoretical, it is the approach that most comprehensively alerts us to the complexity and openness of 
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basic concepts and their grounding in practical knowledge. It thus can be seen as a baseline for the 
other two approaches, which I suggest mark two poles for ways of dealing with a concept’s 
‘basicness’: at one end the ambition (and struggle) to contain it through scientific method, at the other 
end a commitment to embrace it through genealogy as a form of political critique. 
 
The Historical Approach 
As the name suggests, the historical approach foregrounds the temporal context to provide a better 
understanding of a concept’s place in and evolution throughout ‘history’. Starting from the view that 
concepts are ‘in motion’ it traces how a particular concept is understood and employed differently 
throughout history, how it evolved and how we arrive at the meaning(s) we employ today. As such, 
the motivation is not simply historical curiosity and to illuminate how concepts were used in the past. 
It also generates a better understanding of how concepts ‘push us to think along certain lines, thus 
enabling us to conceive of how to act on alternative and less constraining definitions of our 
situation’.42 Historians of ideas, philosophers of history, as well as political and literary theorists have 
developed comprehensive and rich studies in this regard, which can be subsumed under the label of 
‘history of concepts’ or ‘concept history’ [Begriffsgeschichte]. Koselleck is a leading figure in this 
field and much of the preceding discussion has already drawn on his insights.43 Here I outline some 
key aspects of his approach and tensions within it. 
 
Analysing the history of a basic concept goes far beyond etymology, the tracing of a word’s 
evolution from its alleged ‘roots’ or ‘origins’ to current usage. It deals with the evolution of 
conceptual language and thought in the context of historical experience and is especially interested in 
recording and explaining changes in a concept’s meaning. Crudely put, one could say that this 
approach tries to understand, and tell a story about, the ‘life’ of a basic concept by looking at four 
phenomena: (1) Concept invention (emergence): how a new concept establishes itself in a particular 
historical context. (2) Concept fixation (reification): how a particular meaning becomes hegemonic 
and gains ‘common sense’ status. (3) Concept transformation (modification): how a term takes on a 
new meaning, or meanings. And, finally, (4) concept disappearance: how a concept ceases to be used 
and drops from our vocabulary. Concept history does not only describe such dynamics but also 
involves explanation of why concepts emerge, are modified, or disappear. 
 
                                                
42 Melvin Richter, ‘Appreciating a Contemporary Classic: The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe and Future 
Scholarship’, in The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts, eds. Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter 
(Washington D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1996), 10. 
43 On his work and influence see Lehmann and Richter, The Meaning of Historical Terms; Willibald Steinmetz, 
‘Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte – The State of the Art’, in Sprache - Kognition - Kultur, eds. H. Kämper and 
L.M. Eichinger (Berlin andNew York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008): 174–97; and articles in the journal 
Contribution to the History of Concepts. 
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The approach advanced by Koselleck is especially interested in exploring how such 
conceptual changes correlated with the discontinuity of political, social and economic structures, and 
how and why certain experiences and structural changes were understood in particular ways.44 Thus, it 
analyses convergence and divergence between ‘real’ history and how ‘history’ was framed by 
contemporaries, with a particular focus on how divergences generated either new concepts or changed 
the meaning of existing ones. Loosely following Willibald Steinmetz, conceptual change has three 
aspects: first, the loss of plausibility of existing concepts which cannot grasp new or unexpected 
events and experiences; second, an irritation prompted by adopting words from another language or 
switching between socio-linguistic contexts; and third, the strategic usefulness of a new concept 
through its ability to absorb diverse perspectives and its intuitive resonance (its metaphorical quality, 
for instance).45 The approach also explores the configuration of the societies and historical periods in 
which concepts emerge or are transformed. It treats (the analysis of) conceptual change as a window 
into understanding societal transformations and, as such, historical changes. In line with Koselleck’s 
note that concepts are not only indicators of but also factors in change, which implies that concepts do 
something, the historical approach also considers the concept’s representational performance. That is, 
it asks how a concept influences decisions, actions and social relations during particular historical 
moments and, ultimately, shapes the course of history. 
 
Analysing all this requires sensitivity to how concepts and socio-political structures implicate 
each other, in other words, how concepts become basic. It also grapples with fundamental questions 
regarding the possibilities and limits of historical representation, often expressed as tensions. One 
tension concerns its ambiguity regarding the relationship between language and historical reality: 
despite emphasising the primacy of language, concept history does not take the radical position that 
there is nothing outside language. If that was so, it could not investigate the relationship between 
concepts and socio-political structures, including material context, in a way that lends the latter some 
sort of causal force. While this epistemological dualism may strike one as problematic, Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht suggests that remaining in a state of ‘indecision’ was a conscious move that enabled 
contributors of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe to use this ambiguity productively.46 Another issue 
is that a focus on linguistic and socio-political structures neglects agency. After all, concepts do not 
act (on their own); looking at a ‘concept in action’ requires looking at who is using it. So to 
understand their historical evolution we must also ask what historical actors do with concepts, why 
and how they assign and manipulate meaning. Tracing the use of concepts among a variety of agents 
                                                
44 Reification is a distinct concern of the third approach discussed below. 
45 Steinmetz, ‘Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte’, 188–91. 
46 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Dimensionen und Grenzen der Begriffsgeschichte (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
2006), 5. 
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in a given society, beyond a few elite figures, is not an easy task and requires a fine-grained analysis 
that is difficult to do when taking a macro-historical perspective.47 
 
This leads to the methodological challenge of tracing patterns of political language 
surrounding a particular concept both in a specific place and time (synchronic analysis) and across 
space and time (diachronic analysis). For Koselleck the two modes of analysis are inseparable, and for 
him it is the alternation between the two that reveals that a concept can never be reduced to a single 
meaning.48 The decision about how to balance and combine diachronic and synchronic analysis is 
partly informed by the kind of change one wants to look at: whether one seeks to trace ‘concepts in 
motion’ from a macro-historical perspective, which analyses the evolution of a concept across a long 
period of time, or to reconstruct ‘concepts in action’ in a micro-diachronic analysis, which delves into 
the complexity of how a concept performs and changes in a temporally and spatially confined setting. 
 
The task of relating basic concepts developed and used in different historical periods is often 
presented as a technical challenge, however the deeper issue is not technical, as illustrated in J.G.A. 
Pocock’s scepticism about tracing the evolution of a concept through time. In Pocock’s view, 
analysing a particular historical context should take priority, thereby placing ‘premium upon the 
synchronic’.49 This is in line with a mode of historical analysis attributed to the Cambridge School, 
which highlights the importance of thinking carefully about how to conceive of and capture historical 
context and what to consider to be adequate sources for reconstructing a concept’s meaning.50 Yet 
Pocock, who was influenced by Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm,51 goes further in suggesting that 
(the meaning of) a concept is always bound to the discursive and, especially, ideational structures 
governing a society at a particular point in time and only really exists within them. Thus, the issue is 
not only the methodological complexity of tracing a distinct conceptual cluster in a multi-layered and 
dynamic context. Rather, Pocock doubts the very notion of a concept having a history whose meaning 
can (or needs to) be understood across political contexts and, hence, time.52 This scepticism appears to 
be grounded in the fact that identifying a basic concept is not simply an empirical undertaking but also 
                                                
47 See Steinmetz, ‘Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte’. 
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51 See J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time (The University of Chicago Press, 1989); J.G. A. Pocock, 
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a theoretical act. The reluctance to grant this role and, hence, the ability to identify a basic concept 
across time to the analyst thus reveals a discomfort among some historians not simply with macro-
history but with theory. 
 
The Scientific Approach 
The scientific approach is driven by the modern ambition to demystify the world and sees concepts as 
methodological tools for measuring, explaining and predicting that world. Labeling this approach 
‘scientific’ does not imply that the historical approach is ‘unscientific’, if science is broadly 
understood as sophisticated, systematic and methodologically guided analysis for the purpose of 
producing knowledge. Yet whereas the historical approach aims at understanding the use and change 
of concepts in/over time, the scientific approach outlined here engages in what Herbert Blumer calls 
‘precision endeavors’, concerned with improving our conceptual toolkit. Guided by the conviction 
that only ‘clear concepts’ bring scholarly knowledge ‘into close and self-correcting relations’ with 
empirical reality,53 the scientist seeks to sharpen its tools by refining and revising concepts. However, 
the aim to develop better, in the sense of both more accurate and more useful concepts that ‘work’ in 
different geographical and cultural locations faces a tension. By treating concepts as analytical 
categories embedded in universally valid theories that can travel across space, the approach maintains 
the separateness of the theoretical dimension and, thus, seeks to distance its concepts from practical 
knowledge. At the same time, the approach holds that the meaning of concepts is substantiated and, 
by extension, theories are validated through empirical research in particular places. In trying to deal 
with this tension, namely to combine the universal and the particular, the (reflexive) scientist also 
grapples with a concept’s ‘basicness’. 
 
An influential figure in Political Science representing this approach is Giovanni Sartori, who 
recognised that social scientists use concepts not only as elements of a theoretical system but also, 
indeed primarily, for collecting empirical data and, hence, treat them as ‘data containers’.54 Yet his 
training in political philosophy also made Sartori sensitive to the fact that concepts have a history and, 
hence, come laden with meaning. This lead him to argue that researchers need to think carefully about 
how to employ – apply – concepts empirically, especially in comparative research. While accepting 
that the meaning content of a concept is built up in the process of ‘measuring’, that is, gathering data 
in particular places, Sartori worried that concepts are used across geographical and cultural contexts 
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54 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, The American Political Science Review 
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without understanding a concept’s history and the socio-political field it is made to work in.55 He 
warned that failure to recognise this richness – and, effectively, the ‘basicness’ of a concept – 
produces ‘conceptual confusion’.56 To tackle such confusion, Sartori argued, analysts must address 
‘meaning before measurement’ and work on reconciling universal and particular meanings that would 
allow concepts to function as ‘empirical universals’.57 
 
Essentially, this approach takes a careful look at how a concept ‘travels’ across space and 
what happens to it in the process. It asks researchers to pay attention to (i) the concept’s ‘extension’, 
the process in which a concept widens and shifts its boundaries to include more and/or different 
elements, thus becoming broader and more complex in meaning, and (ii) the concept’s ‘intension’, the 
process which zooms ‘inwards’ and highlights its core elements, thus specifying its meaning. Scholars 
offering strategies to navigate this dynamic often do so in an overly technical discussion about logic, 
semantics and methods.58 Here it suffices to say that central to this is the process by which the 
concept, in its clustered form, travels from theoretical reasoning to empirical investigation and back. 
That is, the approach seeks to understand how a concept is altered in the process of application, or 
operationalisation, when it moves from the abstract level, where it carries a general meaning, to the 
concrete empirical level, where it functions as a ‘data container’. To use Sartori’s well-known 
metaphor, it traces how a concept is modified when the researcher climbs down ‘the ladder of 
abstraction’.59 Sartori tries to capture the modification through the notions of ‘high level’ and ‘low 
level’ concepts, yet the more basic point is that this ‘climbing’ exercise, including the upward move 
of placing empirical findings within a theoretical argument, is a creative task of translation, adaptation 
and perhaps even transformation of meaning.60 
 
That said, driven by the aim to maintain universally valid theories the scientific approach 
seeks to manage and minimise ‘distortions’ by devising techniques and rules that allow concepts to 
travel across space without disappearing into the particular. Not surprisingly, Sartori’s solution is to 
call for a ‘minimal definition’ that fixates a concept’s ‘basic structure’ and allows capturing the ‘core 
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attributes’ of a phenomenon across contexts.61 There are two interrelated problems with this. First, the 
scientist’s ambition to construct ever more accurate concepts sees vagueness and ambiguity as 
‘defects’ and a ‘basic deficiency’.62 Yet this goes against the point made earlier that concepts are 
inherently and necessarily vague and ambiguous, and it ignores that this is what often makes them 
useful to scholars and practitioners. After all, theories have a long shelf life not least because their key 
concepts remain vague. Similarly, in diplomatic negotiations compromise and agreements tend to rely 
on sufficiently vague concepts that can be interpreted differently by each side. 
 
Second, the notion of universally valid ‘minimal definitions’ is confronted with scholarly 
disputes about the meaning of basic concepts. As W.B. Gallie famously pointed out, scholars using 
the ‘same’ concept in different ways often are unable to agree which meaning is ‘better’ or ‘more 
accurate’, rendering the concept ‘essentially contested’. Gallie noted that ‘endless disputes’ about the 
proper use of basic concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘justice’ are not the result of sloppy 
appropriations or misreadings but, rather, are ‘perfectly genuine: although not resolvable by argument 
of any kind, [they] are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence’.63 For 
the scientist this is puzzling, especially as a dispute suggests that there must be agreement that both 
sides are actually talking about the same concept. Gallie argues that this is the case when both derive 
their reading from ‘a process of imitation and adaptation from an exemplar’, that is, when both sides 
use the same source from which their respective reading of the concept flows.64 Yet because the 
‘exemplar’ – like all basic concepts – is internally complex and open/ambiguous, theorists are able to 
focus on different elements, interpret the same configuration differently and develope different 
adaptations. Thus, essential contestedness arises out of a combination of the complex internal 
logic/configuration of a concept and its evolution in different, perhaps incompatible, contexts. 
 
For the issue at hand, this suggests that in many cases the ‘same’ concept cannot be 
transferred between theoretical frameworks as its meaning is embedded in different conceptual webs, 
logics and incompatible epistemological stances, and is informed by different practical knowledges 
and normative commitments. Consequently the shared exemplar does not have the authority to resolve 
the dispute as both sides can claim to ‘own’ it, and neither is able to persuade the other that its claim 
to ownership is ill-founded. Although this limits the ambition to build ever more accurate concepts, 
the scientific approach still invites investigations into how different readings are developed out of and 
projected back into a historic ‘exemplar’ and to establish a sensible typology of different readings 
without favouring one over another. In doing so, it points to the crucial question of whether (a) the 
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different types are compatible and can be integrated into a single research design, that is whether they 
can be combined, or are claimed to be combinable, into one master concept that cuts across different 
theories (what might be called the ‘Sartori’ position), or whether (b) the types are essentially 
contested and, thus, incompatible and cannot be used to link different theories together, let alone be 
combined under an overarching theoretical framework (the ‘Gallie’ position). 
 
The Political (Critical) Approach 
The third approach starts from the dictum that knowledge is power. It accepts that basic concepts 
fulfil a cognitive function and are central parts of knowledge production in modernity, however in 
contrast to the scientist it views their stabilising function and the attempt to distinguish between 
analytical and practical categories with suspicion. Influenced by a post-modern stance, this approach 
highlights that the order created by concepts is artificial, blocking out the complexity of the world and 
upholding certain power structures that benefit some and disadvantage others. Thus, the approach has 
a dual aim: first, to explore how concepts form and become reified through their use across society, 
and to highlight that concept formation and performances are implicated with structures of power. In 
doing so it overlaps with concept history and it makes the scientific approach part its object of 
analysis.65 Second, the approach seeks to shine light on blind spots and silences in the dominant 
understanding/use of a basic concept by revealing and reactivating ‘subjugated knowledges’.66 It does 
so to disrupt and challenge reified meanings and underlying power structures to open the door for 
alternative conceptions and, ultimately, social change. As such, this approach takes a critical stance 
and explicitly understands concept analysis as an engagement with politics, indeed as political in 
motivation. 
 
To understand reification processes, the political(critical) approach investigates how 
particular kinds of knowledge are produced, that is, how concepts are used and perform in society and 
with what effect. It highlights that, by giving meaning to ‘things’, concepts don’t just make these 
things intelligible, they actually make things, that is, in the words of Michel Foucault they 
‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’.67 As such, this approach focuses on the 
productive power of basic concepts as not merely guiding but constituting thinking and action, 
identities, or subjectivities, on both elite and the subaltern levels, as well as altering material realities. 
One important aspect of this analysis is to explore how basic concepts and the epistemes, that is, the 
concept webs, theories and broader discourses surrounding them become institutionalised. 
Investigating the process of institutionalisation involves tracing how the ideational content of the 
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concept becomes entwined with material reality. In other words, it studies a concept’s material 
manifestation, including the aesthetic expression of a concept in architectural designs or ‘hard’ forms 
of infrastructure. Yet it also can take more intangible forms if ‘institution’ is understood to not only 
encompass formal structures with a concrete physical presence, but also informal practices which are 
not tied to a particular place but are diffused throughout society in a seemingly uncoordinated manner. 
Analysing how basic concepts exercise power thus largely depends on how we think productive 
power works: does it unfold directly and overtly, or in subtle and hidden ways? Is the power of 
concepts orchestrated by political actors, or do they take on a life of their own without being 
controlled by anyone? Are concepts embedded in a dominant ideology imposed from the top (as in 
Gramscian hegemony), or do they emerge out of and are reproduced by everyday practices (as in 
Foucauldian governmentality)? Analysts need to consider all these angles and most likely a 
combination of the two, as exemplified in Foucault’s analysis of ‘crime’ and ‘madness’.68 In any case, 
the political approach faces a conundrum: the attempt to analyse the political performance of a basic 
concept – the production and effect of its meaning – relies on an understanding of another basic 
concept, namely power. 
 
As noted, the critical/political approach does not stop at exploring the reification and 
reproduction of basic concepts by unmasking power configurations. It also seeks to weaken these 
configurations and act as a critical voice against the temptation to find a singular meaning and accept 
a ‘common sense’. It does so by highlighting techniques of resistance, subversion and contestation of 
meaning and, thus, showing that meaning is (or should be) a matter of politics. Indeed, as the name 
suggests, the political approach actively participates in and seeks to advance contestation and regards 
concept analysis as a mode of resistance.69 One approach exemplifying this is genealogy, which 
overlaps with concept history in exploring the evolution of a concept within socio-political structures. 
Yet as the concern with reification suggests, genealogy is distinct from concept history in that its aim 
is not tracing change, but showing how a concept is assembled into something taken for granted 
while, simultaneously, showing that any notion of a concept having a unified or coherent meaning is 
an illusion. It brings to the fore the historical contingency of stabilised knowledge through the dual 
move of critiquing (deconstructing) the notion of a coherent historical narrative about a concept and 
bringing to the foreground (reconstructing) the marginalised and forgotten aspects. As Connolly puts 
it, genealogy is the ‘reversal of the project of interpretation’.70 
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The genealogical approach rejects the existence of a single source, or ‘origin’, to which a 
given concept can be traced. Instead, Foucault argues, following Nietzsche, if the genealogist ‘listens 
to history he finds…the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms. What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the 
inviolable identity of their origin…it is disparity’.71 Rather than trying to identify an unbroken 
continuity in the historical life of a concept, this approach asks the analyst to ‘identify the accidents, 
the minute deviations…the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations’ that underpin the 
life of a concept.72 In the words of Jens Bartelson, who employed the approach for a study of 
sovereignty, this involves writing ‘a history of the unthought parts of our political understanding [of 
sovereignty]…a history of the epistemic discontinuities, conceptual reversals and changing metaphors 
that…animate the discourse of sovereignty’.73 Such a study of discontinuity and contingency – of how 
things have become accidently attached to the concept and inform its shape – aims at revealing 
aspects of a concept’s life that have been glossed over by conventional accounts and become 
invisible. It seeks to carve out meanings/uses that are ignored because they do not fit established 
discourses, are considered irrelevant or invalid and, hence, are marginalised, squeezed out of sight. 
The resulting picture is not a concept with a unifying shape but fragments of meaning. 
 
While for Foucault these subjugated meanings are expressed in local, everyday practices 
permeating society, they may also be found in the contradictions and tensions of dominant discourses, 
or in elite voices that have become forgotten. Either way, genealogy asks for attention to detail and 
explores how meaning is tied to ‘the most uncompromising places, in what we feel is without history 
– in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts’.74 The commitment to carve out aspects that do not fit 
modern presentations of a concept and are politically inconvenient thus requires a sensitive mind and 
willingness to go against the grain. And it puts reflexivity to the forefront. While other approaches can 
silently fall back into claiming to pursue an objective analysis, the political(critical) approach faces 
the tension between the ambition to destabilise taken for granted meaning without proposing to 
present more comprehensive knowledge about a concept and, hence, a ‘better’ understanding of its 
meaning(s). This is a balancing act, often mitigated through the style of analysis and its presentation, 
namely by avoiding conventional logics and rigid systematicism in favour of a playful, improvised 
and disruptive mode which consciously avoids offering a simple and coherent account. 
 
Conclusion: Implications for Theorising 
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Responding to Guzzini’s call for a wider understanding of concept analysis as a mode of ‘ontological 
theorizing’, this article offered a systematic overview of what this might entail. The article started out 
by suggesting that the key concepts employed by IR scholars are ‘basic’, that is, permeating both 
scholarly and socio-political discourse and central to both. This was followed by a discussion of how 
unpacking such concepts requires seeing them as clusters, or webs, embedded in different contextual 
dimensions. The article then sketched three prominent approaches to concept analysis drawing on the 
work of Koselleck, Sartori and Foucault.75 These approaches do not present polished roadmaps but are 
dynamic projects guided by different views about why and how to engage concepts, including how to 
deal with the ‘basicness’ of a concept: For the historical approach this quality is the very reason for 
tracing a concept through time and exploring its role in societal change, although the approach 
remains vulnerable to the question of whether ‘basicness’ is determined primarily by the historical 
context or by the analyst’s own situatedness. While the scientific approach tries to keep the theoretical 
sphere separate and to block out the basic quality of a concept, it encounters the overlap between 
scholarly and practical knowledge in the process of operationalisation in different cultural spaces. 
Finally, the political(critical) approach takes the issue of ‘basicness’ head-on by highlighting the 
intertwined nature of theoretical and socio-political discourses and the power dynamics underpinning 
concept formation and performance. 
 
Despite having distinct aims and features, the approaches also offer points of connection. 
Most obviously, all three demonstrate, each in their own way, the open and plural nature of basic 
concepts: by highlighting historical change and diversity; by climbing the ‘ladder of abstraction’ and 
establishing typologies; and by showing their contingent form and recovering silenced readings. Thus, 
these approaches present us not with a concept that exists in singular form but, instead, with 
conceptions.76 The form these conceptions take varies, of course: a dynamic concept that evolves 
throughout history; a concept that takes on different empirical forms yet still maintains an abstract 
unity; and a concept that is artificially reified yet at closer inspection reveals nothing but fragments. 
Still, despite their differences in emphasis and angle, all three approaches demand an analytical effort 
that oscillates between deconstruction and reconstruction, and it is this pendulum-like movement that 
shows the complexity, contingency and openness of basic concepts and that gives their analysis its 
unsettling and creative character. 
 
                                                
75 This spectrum is not exhaustive, of course. For a Bourdieusian take, which Guzzini also seems to favour, see 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed,, Bourdieu in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2013). For an approach 
inspired by Derrida, see Badredine Arfi, Rethinking International Relations Theory via Deconstruction 
(London: Routledge, 2012). For tracing a concept through actor-network theory, see Christian Bueger and Felix 
Bethke, ‘Actor-networking the ‘Failed State’ – An Enquiry Into the Life of Concepts’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development 17, no. 1 (2014): 30–60. 
76 Koselleck at one point uses the term ‘collective singular’, Koselleck, Futures Past, 34.  
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Here, then, we return to the issue of theorising. To recall, the article started with the premise 
that concept analysis is the first leg of ontological theorising, not a mode of theorising in and of itself. 
Of course, the work of Koselleck, Sartori and Foucault is infused with philosophical debates and all 
three are recognised as important theorists who think little of a strict separation between empirical 
research and theorising. Tracing the evolution of concepts, their use and performance may strike us as 
a largely ‘empirical’ undertaking, but it has an important meta-theoretical underbelly. Not only does 
identifying a (basic) concept, its clustered nature and contextual dimensions involve a significant 
theoretical effort. A reflexive engagement with basic concepts also touches on fundamental questions 
surrounding the meaning and possibility of doing historical/scientific/political analysis and 
concerning suitable methods for undertaking the required, or desired, deconstructive and 
reconstructive moves. 
 
Recognising all this, we still need to ask more directly how concept analysis advances our 
understanding of theory and influences the way we think about and ‘do’ theory, that is, how it affects 
the practice of theorising. So let me conclude with a few concrete thoughts which bring together some 
of the points from the discussion. Most generally, all three approaches make us better theorists 
because they train us to carefully reflect on core assumptions and building blocks of theoretical 
frameworks. Tracing the ways a basic concept is embedded in a particular theory, how it relates to 
other concepts and how these relations form a conceptual web on which a theoretical argument rests, 
contributes to our understanding of how that theory is built. And having a better picture of a theory’s 
internal composition makes it easier to see its logical strengths and limitations. One implication of the 
historical approach is that it invites, if not requires, historicising this picture. Koselleck’s angle asks 
for tracing the historical evolution of theories via their core concepts, following the logic that if the 
building blocks change, the theoretical house takes on a new form as well. Slightly different, the 
Cambridge School angle would hold that, through their concepts, theories are bound to a particular 
historical environment, that is, they belong to and only make sense in a particular historical context. 
Either way, the approach has implications for how we understand a theoretical ‘tradition’,77 and 
certainly makes it difficult, if not impossible, to uphold the notion of theory as a stable construct over 
time. This may be disconcerting to traditionalists, yet seeing different meanings behind a shared term 
and understanding their historical trajectories enables both more targeted conversations and 
recognising the limits of such conversations. Here, the question of whether typologies can be 
connected through a minimal definition or are essentially contested, as debated in the scientific 
approach, has crucial implications for scholarly communication and collaboration: it either means that 
a concept can serve as a bridge for scholars working with different theoretical frameworks, enabling 
                                                
77 Historians of ideas have long grappled with this issue, of course. 
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fruitful exchange, as has been suggested for the concepts of power78 and practice,79 or it can deceive 
theorists into believing such exchange is taking place when in fact they are talking past each other.80 
 
More importantly, awareness of multiple meanings and, indeed, of the instability of 
conceptual meaning raises the question why we employ a concept in a particular way and what the 
consequences are, and it opens the door to formulating an alternative. Here the creative role and 
responsibility of the theorist comes to the foreground. If anything, concept analysis highlights that 
theorists are not passive consumers and distributors of thought, but active minds who (can) make a 
choice about which reading of a concept (not) to adopt. The scientific approach alerts us that this 
choice is not made once and for all at the outset of a research project, but made continuously 
throughout. Against the sterile view of theories being ‘tested’ against empirical evidence, it directs 
attention to the process in which theories are transformed when coming in contact with the real world, 
i.e. when their key concepts are substantiated empirically. This reflexive move is further exploited by 
the historical and, obviously, the political(critical) approaches, which function as an antidote to 
theoretical reification and (should) guard against ‘the imperialism of categories’, to borrow Susanne 
Hoeber Rudolph’s phrase, by embedding a critical element within theorising.81 Genealogy, especially, 
can be used to reveal the narrow configuration of a theory that is complicit in reifying conceptual 
meaning and to destabilise this theory by fragmenting its basic concepts. By blurring the line between 
theoretical discussions and ‘conceptual politics’,82 this approach asks us to explore and critique a 
theory’s political performance. And by exposing the idea of a stable concept/theory as not only a 
convenient illusion but a political project, it also reminds us that a concept analysis which moves us 
beyond this idea is also a political move. 
 
This leaves us with the question of whether and how concept analysis, including the critical 
variant, can support the process of theory building which, in my view, should be a central aspect of 
ontological theorising. Can the fragmentation of theory, the exposure of its contingent nature and the 
reconstruction of lost meanings be used as a productive stimulant for constructing (another) theory? 
Can a constant (re)writing, expanding and updating of our conceptual dictionary still provide the sort 
of building blocks that theorists are looking for? The crude answer, I suggest, is ‘no’, but ‘yes’. If 
                                                
78 Michael Barnett and Robert Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization 59, no. 1 
(2005): 39–75. 
79 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. 
80 See Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Thinking about Power’, in Power in World Politics, eds. Felix Berenskoetter and 
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82 See, for instance, Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki, eds., The Conceptual Politics of Democracy 
Promotion (London: Routledge, 2012). 
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concepts are to perform the modern function of bringing order and reducing complexity so that 
theorists can reduce them to discrete variables, then concept analysis undermines this function. Once 
we go about unpacking concepts and show their complexity and openness, their contingent and 
context-bound meaning, to the modern mind these conceptions look more like a can of worms than 
building blocks. Rather than constituting theories, concept analysis seems more effective in 
destabilising and unraveling them. That said, it would be wrong to conclude that concept analysis 
makes theorising impossible. It just requires departing from the notion of theory as a timeless 
abstraction that can be tested empirically and continuously improved into a universal form of 
knowledge. Instead, it prompts us to conceive of theorising as an unstable and unfinished process that 
builds on conceptions, and to see sensitivity to the contextual and contingent nature of concepts not as 
a problem but as a resource for creative theorising. Acknowledging that our theories and their core 
concepts are unstable and our reading of them context-dependent may be difficult for some IR 
scholars, not least because this limits their explanatory reach. Yet such an acknowledgment does not 
discredit theorising as a reflexive process of exploring and constructing abstract arguments through 
basic concepts. 
 
The bottom line is that the deconstructive and reconstructive moves intrinsic to concept 
analyses free space for thinking differently and devising alternative meanings and, thereby, enable 
theory building. They encourage scholars to play with definitions and change the meaning of a 
concept central to a particular theory, to revive hidden concepts that are integral to a theory yet had 
been silenced, or to introduce new concepts into our theoretical discussions. Such creative endeavours 
have always taken place in IR and they keep the field alive. They might lead to the formulation of a 
new theory, but they may also reveal that the most enduring IR theories are open and dynamic 
configurations with unstable concepts in the first place. In the end, when contemplating their approach 
to and choice of concept(s), theorists should keep in mind Connolly’s point that welcoming 
conceptual pluralism is not incompatible with the commitment to appropriate and advance a particular 
reading that suits our situation and agenda.83 After all, once we recognise that basic concepts are not 
simply analytical tools but forces that organise social life, we may well take the value position that 
one reading is better than another. 
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